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This thesi-s describes, in general overview terms,
the fcudget execution process from the time the
appropriations bill becomes law until the disbursement
of funds to the private sector emphasizing the roles
played by all the elements which make up the execution
process. The Department of Defense budget execution
process is then analyzed based on incurred obligation
and expenditure patterns using time series analysis
techniques. Results of the analysis are displayed
graphically and the policy implications are discussed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The budget process has four main phases: (1) executive
formulation and transmittal; (2) congressional action; (3)
budget execution and control; and (4) review and audit.
Most discussion and analysis of federal budgeting focuses on
formulation , transmittal and congressional action. The
topic of this thesis is an overview of the federal budget
execution process as it applies to the Department of Defense
and some facets of its controllability. In most instances
one is able to find, in one source, a description of the
entire budget formulation and congressional process. This
is not the case with the execution process. Most literature
concentrating on the budget cycle merely mentions the
execution phase as falling action to the climax, the
appropriations bill. This thesis will attempt to bring
perspective to the budget execution process and illustrate
the many players which influence this phase of the budget
cycle. Figure 1 gives a guick view of the players involved.
The emphasis is directed toward the Department of
Defense and the role it plays due to the commonly accepted
analysis that, of the portion of the budget which is
considered controllable, the greatest portion is the defense
budget. This is strongly supported by comments from the
popular press reflecting the sensitivity of our economy to
the execution of the defense budget and the efforts to
control it.
The second part of this thesis attempts to evaluate the
applicability of the expenditure phase of the Department of
Defense budget as a policy instrument using time series

analyses . The basic assumption is that budget execution is
the correct measuring device for evaluation of the effect of
our planning process. It should follow that this would
necessarily have to be a very powerful policy control
variable and it would further follow that we should expect
to find correlation between desired policy achievement and
Department of Defense fiscal activity because of the greater
degree of controllability in the Defense budget.
The actual organization of the analysis in this thesis
includes background on the defense budget execution process,
the roles of various elements therein and discussion of the
time series modeling. These sections are follDwed by the
analysis of DOD outlays and obligations and their
implications. Conclusions and signifiance of the results
are discussed and possible areas for further study are
suggested.

II. DESIGN 0? THE EXECUTION PROCESS
The procedure for budget execution evolves in accordance
with the distribution of power within a government. The
authority of the legislative vis-a-vis the administration
will be reflected in budget execution. The carrying cut of
the budget is an executive responsibility. Within the
administration the role of the chief executive and his staff
agencies, in their control of operating departments and
agencies, will be manifest in the techniques which are
employed to carry out the governments financial plan
[Burkhead, 1956].
Once budget formulation is complete and after the
Appropriation Act has been signed into law by the President
the wheels of executive authority must start in motion to
insure the budget will accomplish its purpose. The primary
authority exists in the Office of Management and Budget and
in the Department of the Treasury. It is these two elements
within the executive which will control the execution of the
budget.
The Office of Management and Budget (0MB) was
established pursuant to Reorganization Plan no. 2 of 1970.
Its powers came from the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
which established the Bureau of the Budget as a staff agency
of the President. Although directly responsible to the
President, the Bureau was originally placed in the Treasury
Department. When the Executive Office of the President was
created in 1939, the Bureau was placed in that Office.
The Budget and Accounting Act made it the Bureau's duty
10

to assist the President in the preparation of the annual
budget. The act gave the Bureau the authority "to assemble,
correlate, revise, reduce, or increase the estimates of the
agencies within its span of control." A further increase in
power is seen by the General Appropriations Act of fiscal
year 1951 which gave the Bureau precise legal authority for
the establishment of reserves against appropriations to
effect economies and savings during the fiscal year.
The government, like most individuals and business,
typically commits itself to expenditures before the
expenditures are actually made. This is seen in the case of
hiring employees and letting contracts. Before any
Government agency can make an expenditure, permission must
be obtained from the Congress to commit or obligate the
Government for the expenditure. An authorization by
Congress gives approval of functions or activities of an
agency. In other words, the Congress passes legislation
authorizing or approving activities such as defense research
and development. For many agencies, the authorizing
legislation specifies a maximum amount that can be
appropriated [Capra, 1974], and in essence says the agency
can now seek appropriations for its approved programs. The
legislation which grants this authority to commit the
Government is referred to as "obligat ional authority."
The obligaticnal authority (also called budget
authority) provided by the Congress in the various
appropriations bills are of several types. The most common
type is seen in the appropriation of funds. An
appropriation allows an agency to commit the Government by
orders, contracts, and agreements for specific types and
amounts of future expenditures. Appropriations are
generally defined as new obligational authority (NOA) . It
further allows the agency to make future expenditures as
committments are fulfilled. An agency's total obligational
11

authority (TOA) includes not only NOA but also unobligated
balances from prior years' appropriations. Agencies
generally have two years after the expiration of
obligational authority to complete the financial
transactions (disbursement of funds) associated with that
authority [31 U.S. Code, 701-706]. Figure 2 illustrates the
relationship of these authorities.
"Contract authority" is another type of obligational
authority. It is very much like the appropriation except it
provides no power to make expenditures associated with the
obligation. Contract Authority permits obligations in
advance of appropriations and therefore requires subsequent
appropriation or some monetary receipts for liquidation.
Typically they are definite in amount, e.g., the dollar
amount of air-navigation facilities that can be contracted
for in a particular year. Sometimes they may be indefinite
in amount, e.g., contract for the building in connection
with the extension of the Capitol. Contract authorizations
are used generally where more than a year is expected to
lapse between the time an obligation is placed and the
expenditures become necessary. It is used primarily in the
procurement activities of defense. This is an area which
does not have the positive control of an appropriation and
over which Congress may desire to exercise close
supervision.
Obligational authority also exists in our "authority to
spend debt receipts" which allows an agency to incur
obligations and make payments for specified purposes out of
borrowed monies. Where such authority pertains to borrowing
from the Treasury, it is authority to spend "public" debt
receipts. Authority for a Government agency to borrow
directly from the public or from a Government-administered
fund available for investment is authority to spend "agency
debt receipts." This type of authority does not always come
12

in appropriations bills and is frequently referred to as
"backdoor financing." For example, the Treasury may be
authorized to provide public debt receipts to an agency,
often in exchange for notes of the agency. Since the dollar
balances in the bank accounts of the Treasury are not
distinguishable by source, whether obtained from taxes or
borrowing, this type of authorization represents an
appropriation to commit and to spend government funds just
like any other appropriation. This type of funding is
supposed to be the exception not the rule and is almost
unheard of in defense areas [Capra, 1974].
The fourth and last form of budget authority comes in
the form of " reappropriations. " This allows an agency to
incur obligations and make payments amounting to part of or
all the unobligated balance of an otherwise expired one-year
or multiple-year appropriations, whether for the same or
different purpose. Reappropriations are counted as budget
authority in the year of the congressional action which
authorizes such action. Figure 3 illustrates these four
sources of budget authority and how they are combined to
result in total obligational authority.
Budget authority may be classified as definite or
indefinite, permanent or current. Definite authority is a
definite sum or amount of resources made avaible.
Indefinite authority is not specified by amount and may be
related to seme other expected income, e.g. receipts for a
particular tax revenue. Current authority is new budget
authority enacted by Congress in or immediately preceding
the fiscal year involved-. Permanent authority is new budget
authority made available each year by virtue of one time or
standing legislation and does not require further action by
Congress
.
Appropriations are granted to accounts in various forms
13

and time frames. "One-year accounts", which are the most
common, allow an agency to incur obligations within only one
fiscal year, the grant expiring at the end of the year. If
obligations are incurred in the year, obligated balances of
such appropriations remain available indefinitely for the
making of expenditures in payment of the obligations.
"Multiple-year accounts" are available for incurring
obligations for a specified period of time in excess of one
year with the obligated balances remaining available
indefinitely for payment of obligations. These
appropriation accounts are used primarily for programs of an
unusual seasonal nature or as applicable to defense
characteristics such as Navy shipbuilding.
"No-year accounts" are available for both obligation and
expenditure until the purpose is accomplished. This type of
appropriation is used primarily for certian types of benefit
payments and for construction of projects where a time limit
would not appreciably add to the system of expenditure
control. Other examples of no-year appropriations include
some research and many trust fund appropriations. Figure 4
illustrates the various categories in terms of time frames
of appropriations accounts.
Accounts are not necessarily permanent in nature and
there is also a classification to cover these. Unexpired
and expired accounts are as the name implies. It should be
noted that in expired accounts, where the authority may no
longer exist for incurring obligations, outlays are still
permitted to pay obligations previously incurred.
In considering the objectives of a system for budget
execution a few thoughts should come to mind. Congress,
having approved the budget through the appropriation
process, had some basic objectives, reasoning, or intent and
14

these should be preserved. Just as budget preparation must
be concerned with structuring the efficient use of scarce
resources, budget execution should be concerned with
carrying out that efficiency. A third thought which is
always prevalent is the nation's economic conditions which
require some programs to inevitably change over time. The
ability of a budget execution system to cope with this is
largely dependent on the way in which the budget
authorizations are written by the legislature. To insure
the spirit of flexibility, the budget authorization should
be permissive, not mandatory, i.e., the authority to incur
obligations and to make expenditures must not be mandatory.
A balance of permissiveness and flexibility with positive
control must be struck.
15

III. THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT OF THE BUDGET
Following congressional passage of an appropriations
bill and signature by the President, agencies must submit to
the Office of Management of the Budget (OMB) a proposed plan
for apportionment. This plan indicates the funds required
for operations. Apportionment basically means the time rate
at which the obligational authority can be used.
The apportionment process is intended to prevent
obligation of an account in a manner that would require
deficiency or supplemental appropriations and to achieve the
most effective and economical use of amounts made avaible.
In apportioning any account, some funds may be reserved to
provide for contingencies or to effect savings, pursuant to
the Antidef iciency Act. They may also be deferred or
proposed for rescission for ether reasons, pursuant to the
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
Budget authority, balances, and other budgetary
resources are stated in terms of authority to incur
obligations. The operations of the apportionment system and
the fundamental controls are on an obligational basis.
Thus, apportionments are generally based on obligations.
However, OMB, at its option, may apportion accounts on some
other basis that will provide effective controls.
Under Executive Order 11541, of July 1, 1970,
responsibility for making apportionments was deligated to
the Director of OMB. OMB may make apportionments or
reapportionments, including the withholding of funds, on the
basis of agency requests or on its own initiative. The
16

authority is usually apportioned by quarters over the period
of the appropriations to insure the obligational authority
is not spent faster than Congress intended and to insure the
most economical and effective use of the funds. However,
when approved by OMB, amounts may be apportioned for other
time periods; for activities, projects, objects, or for a
combination thereof. Budgetary resources are not
apportioned for periods longer than one fiscal year.
In the case of No-year accounts and multiple-year
accounts in which funds are available beyond the current
fiscal year, apportionments will cover the anticipated
financial requirements for the current year. Funds not
required for the current year but included in the
appropriations are enumerated in the apportionment request
by appropriate agencies.
Agencies can request changes in the level or time
periods covered by apportionment. Consideration is given to
apportioning funds for time periods other than calender
quarters or at levels other than the appropriations account,
whenever such periods or levels are more representative of
program activities and will facilitate their execution.
Unobligated balances of apportioned funds become part of
the new fiscal year's apportionment in the majority of
cases. New apportionments are reduced by any portion of the
unobligated balance estimated to be brought forward on the
most recently approved apportionment request received from
an agency or department. 0M3 works under the premise that
new apportionment action for a fiscal year will be
independent of all apportionment of the preceding year [0I1B
Cir. No. 34]. That is, unobligated balances which were
identified for expenditure during the last period of




OMB can also exercise its power by withholding resources
from obligation on its o-wn initiative or upon the request of
an agency. Budgetary resources may be deferred as reserves
to provide for contingencies under provisions of the
Antideficiency Act; or they may be deferred for other
reasons under the Impoundment Control Act, except that funds
available for only one fiscal year may not be deferred
throughout that year.
The Impoundment Control Act specifies that whenever the
President determines that all or part of any budget
authority will net be required to carry out the full
objectives or scope of programs for which it is provided,
the President will propose to Congress -chat the funds be
rescinded. Likewise, if all or part of any budget authority
limited to a fiscal year is to be reserved for the entire
fiscal year, a recission will be proposed. Recission of
budget authority may also be proposed as a means for
initiating fiscal policy. Generally amounts proposed for
recission will be withheld during the time the proposals are
being considered by Congress.
The apportionment of funds is not to be regarded as
resolving any question as to the legality of using funds for
the purpose for which apportioned, Any question as to the
legality of using funds for a particular purpose is resolved
through other channels.
Apportionment action by OMB implies approval of, or
concurrence with, any comments inserted on the apportionment
request by the agency. Where OMB specifically disagrees
with any such comments, it will be noted on the approved
apportionment documentation.
Agencies submit their apportionment reguests indicating
the time frame and levels desired. Initial apportionment
18

schedules from agencies reflecting the year's schedule is
submitted to OMB by 21 August. In those cases where all of
the budgetary resources for an account results from current
action by the Congress, initial apportionment schedules
might not be submitted until 10 days after the approval of
the appropriation or substantive acts providing new budget
authority or by 21 August, whichever is later [OMB Cir No.
34].
In those cases where initial apportionment requests are
submitted by 21 August, OMB will notify agencies of the
action taken on the initial requests by 10 September (new
budget time table) . Those requests which may have been
delayed due to pending action by Congress will receive
notification from OMB within 30 calendar days after the
approval of the act providing new budgetary authority.
19

IV. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTROL OF THE BUDGET
This section will review those elements in the execution
process which influence the results of policy guidelines
through control exercised by the Secretary of Defense. The
Secretary of Defense can exercise control in the very
begining of the phase at the appropriations step and further
extend this control through the allocation process, the
obligation process and reprogramming activities. Transfers
and impoundemnts can also be effective tools of control
available to the Department of Defense.
A. APPROPRIATIONS
After the Appropriations Act has been signed into law by
the President, the Act is sent to the General Services
Administration (GS A) where a public law number is assigned
and the law is published. The GSA has the responsibility
for the National Archives and Reports Service whose function
is to publish laws. After this action, a copy is sent to
the Treasury Department, the Office of Management and
Budget, the General Accounting Office, and to the Secretary
of Defense and the seperate services.
When Congress has not completed its deliberations
leading to the enactment of the annual Department of Defense
Appropriations Act by 1 October, it provides funding
authority through a joint "continuing resolution" making
interim appropriations available to the Department of
Defense. The intent of the continuing resolution is to
20

provide funds to maintain operations at a minimum rate
necessary for the orderly continuation of activities until
regular appropriations are enacted. Passed on to the
departments within DOD, the continuing resolution is called
the expense operating budget and is further allocated to
subordinate agencies within the departments. The expense
operating budget is the budget authority until the
appropriations bill is passed and signed into law.
Once the Defense Appropriation Bill is passed, it is
binding as to how much the DOD can obligate thereunder and f
within its broad purposes, what can be bought.
The apportionment process , exercised through OMB,
reflects Presidential control and can restrict the rata or
purpose of obligations as provided by law. Apportionments
are made on the basis of hearings conducted by 0MB, Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , and DOD components
wherein apportionment requests are considered. This
apportionment process also serves the important function of
updating the budget which was submitted to OSD more than a
year previously. Once the apportionment is released by 0MB,
it becomes the Secretary of Defense's authorized obligation
rate.
The Secretary of Defense exercises his primary financial
control by establishing the rate of obligations of funds for
the DOD components based on the 0MB apportionment release.
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will submit to
the Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller their
proposed operating budgets and financial plans for review in
anticipation of the formal submission of an apportionment
request based on the appropriations act. This action is the
motivation for the review and update of the budget.
Submission of this plan and budget also requires the agency
to prepare monthly schedules for obligations and commitments
21

for the first half of the coming fiscal year. Figure 5
illustrates the interaction between these elements in the
apportionment process.
Upon receipt of these plans and budgets, analysts from
OSD evaluate in substantive detail and make their
recommendations to the Comptroller based on evaluations of
program proposals (feasibility, desirability, priorities,
timing, etc.), procurement, and research and development
line items. It is at this point the Secretary of Defense
can exercise additional financial control by deferring
programs until later in the budget execution program. This
is used to restrict the flow of funds, as well as to control
programs by withholding funding authorization until complete
justification is provided.
To meet changing needs, the Secretary of Defense has the
authority, with the approval of the Office of Management and
Budget, to transfer funds from one appropriations account to
another if such transfers do not exceed statutory limits.
There are four other methods besides the transfer authority
available to OSD and the Department of Defense components
which provide flexibility within appropriations. These are
Supplemental Budget, Contract Authorization, Deficiency
Budgets, and Reprogramming
.
Supplemental Budgets and Deficiency Budgets are in
essence additions to the annual budget proposed by the
Secretary of Defense to reguest funds for major unforeseen
emergencies during the current year. Statutory authority
under which contracts or other obligations may be entered
into prior to an appropriation for the payment of such
obligations was discussed under contract authority.
Reprogramming will be discussed later.
The Secretary of Defense's funding authorization
22

provides agencies with a document which establishes
authorized funding levels; i.e., obligational authority for
both direct and reimbursable programs for each
appropriations and expense authority for military personnel
of the Active Forces. Generally, this document establishes
applicable program, budget activity, procurement line item,
and program element distributions of the total resources for
the year. These documents are revised during the course of
the year to reflect appropriation enactment, releases from
deferral, reprogramming or other actions which effect the
funding authority.
Agencies submit monthly reports to the Office of
Secretary of Defense reflecting the status of available
funds. These reports are forwarded for review to the Office
of Management and 3udget and the House Appropriations
Committee.
An annual report is prepared by the department
Comptrollers and submitted to the Office of Secretary of
Defense in December as the previous end-of-year (30
September) unobligated and unexpended balances, as well as
the unpaid obligations, of all appropriations and funds.
This report is submitted to the Treasury Department for
establishing year-end balances and to withdraw or restore
funds as necessary.
B. ALLOCATION
Following the establishment of the rate of obligation,
which is quite an involved process, the Secretary of Defense
allocates funds to responsible officials in their
organizations. These allocations are usually divided into
sub-allocations, allotments, and sub-allotments or are
23

included in operating budgets at the user level to make
funds available for commitment, obligation and expenditure.
A commitment is a reservation of funds based upon currently
directed use leading to obligations. An obligation is a
liability; e.g., a firm contract for goods or services. An
expenditure is payment of the obligation. Allocations,
commitments, obligations, and expenditures are carefully
controlled to avoid over spending.
A second level of apportionment occurs within agencies
once the obligational authority is distributed by the Office
of Management and Budget. Each agency is required by law to
have a system of administrative control of their funds for
the following purposes.
1. To restrict obligations or outlays against each
appropriation or fund to the amount of the apportionments of
such appropriation or fund.
2. To enable the agency head to fix responsibility
for the creation of any obligation or the making of any
outlay in excess of an apportionment or reapportionment.
By the time the apporiations bill for a fiscal year is
enacted, the agency's plans for the fiscal year must be
brought up-tc-date. The revisions take account of changes
in the amounts expected to become available and in
conditions that effect the agency's program. The plans at
this stage are usually more specific then they were at the
time the original estimates were prepared. The revised
plans are usually prepared in the same office that prepared
the original budget estimates, and are again reviewed and
consolidated at successive levels in the agency to serve as
a basis for both the apportionment requests to 0M3 and for
allotments within the agency. Agency heads determine the
rate of allotments by month or quarters to the various
24

Administrative units within the agencies. As a result,
additional restrictions may be placed on the use of
obligational authority granted by the Congress provided it
does not conflict with the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
Suballocations are transfers or delegations to the head
of another office, bureau, or command of some portion of the
authorization granted to an allocation holder. The
suballocation document states that all financial control,
juristiction, and responsibility for amounts allocated are
passed to the recipient.
An allotment is an authorization granted within and
pursuant to an allocation or suballocation for the purpose
of incurring commitments, obligations, and expenditures.
The operating budget concept consists of an approved
operating plan which is the basis of authorization and
financial control of resources available for the execution
of program or programs of the indicated organizational or
command level.
C. OBLIGATIONS
A crucial step in the spending process exists in the
obligation of funds. Many decisions regarding the timing of
obligations are initiated at the agency level. If an agency
fails to obligate by a certain time, the funding authority
lapses and reverts to the Treasury. Prior to 1954,
administrators managed to retain access to funds by
including them among a fluid concept called "obligated
balances." The term meant different things to different
people [Fisher, 1975]. Even the definitions by GAO and the
25

Bureau of the Budget (OMB today) did not agree. Reports on
available balances were often misleading.
In 1954 Congress established legal criteria for
obligations, requiring documentary evidence of binding
agreements and other liabilities on the government. This
was a step in the right direction for gaining control but
much confusion remained. Large end-of-t he-year obligation
efforts were experienced leading to the 1955 act of
additional tightening of control by which not more than 20
percent of any funds made available in an appropriations act
could be "obligated" and/or "reserved" during the last two
months of a fiscal year [Parker, 1974-75].
Criticism of these carry over balances continued. The
Hoover Commission emphasized that Congress had no effective
control over the annual budget surplus or deficit, since
there was no direct relationship between what was
appropriated and what was actually obligated or spent. Part
of this dilemma was a result of the practice of
appropriating on a no-year or multiple-year basis creating
large carry over balances.
Although the Hoover Commission pointed out the
shortcomings in carry over balances and contract
obligations, no action was taken to effect a change. The
magnitude of carry over balances increased from year to
year. The budget for fiscal year 1976 showed $493.9
billion in unspent authority available from prior years.
Only $111.6 billion was expected to be spent in the fiscal
year 1976. $354.3 billion was expected to be SDent in
future years. $27.9 billion was scheduled to expire. By
the end of the 1976 fiscal year the total amount of carry
over balances was expected to reach $502.4 billion (figure
6). Consider Arron Wildavsky's recipe for being a poor
nation, not only lack of wealth but also the inability to
26

spend what is available. Wildavsky points out that he found
underspending as high as 75% of the budget in poor nations
where they lacked the capacity to absorb expenditures
[Wildavsky, 1974]. It is not likely that this country would
be classified as poor but Wildavsky's point is an
interesting one for reflection.
Agencies also have access to other funds as the fiscal
year unfolds. Such funds are called "deobligations"
,
"recoveries", or "recoupments". They represent funds that
have been tied up but, for various reasons, are later made
available for agency use. In 1962 the House Appropriations
Committee noted, with displeasure, the Navy's budget for
fiscal year 1962 had estimated $30 million in recoveries
from prior appropriations . Afterwards the Navy discovered
recoveries would come to approximately 3227 million [Fisher,
1975].
D. REPSOGRAMMING
In the area of budgetary control within the Department
of Defense, reprogramming is an effective technique of
budgetary control in the execution process. Reprogramming
is essentially a process of moving funds within a single
appropriations account. One might think that since no
additional money is required, and since the Congress usually
appropriates funds for groups of programs rather than for
individual programs, adjustments within appropriations would
not be a matter of Congressional review. Presidents of the
past have argued that appropriations are to be administered
by the executive branch of government and Congress should
not get in the way of this function. President Eisenhower
asserted in a message to the Congress that, "once an
appropriations is made, the appropriation must, under the
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Constitution, be administered by the executive branch of the
government alone, and the Congress has no right to veto
Executive action to prevent Executive action from becoming
effective [House Document No. 218, 84th Cong. ]. But
Congress rejects this view and closely protects its ability
to execute the budget in this area.
Congress appropriates lump-sum amounts to the Defense
Department. It is the understanding of the Appropriations
Committees and of the Congress that the monies will be spent
in accordance with the original departmental justifications
as appropriately amended.
As the budget year unfolds, new and better applications
of money come to light. Reprogrammings are made for a
number of reasons, including unforeseen developments,
changing requirements, incorrect price estimates, wage rate
adjustments, changes in the international situation, and
legislation enacted subsequent to appropriations.
Reprogramming is entirely nonstatutory and it operates
at the level of subaccounts in the appropriations structure.
Though it is nonstatutory, agencies of the Executive branch
have a strong incentive to comply with Congressional wishes
in order to avoid retaliation through lower funding of
future programs. Reprogramming was not even part of
committee records until the mid-1950' s. As the practice of
shifting funds persisted over the years, members of the
Appropriations Committees began to require certain amounts
of discipline in reprogramming. Reprogram ling procedures
have come to require regular reporting by the Department of
Defense and prior approval of selected items by designated
committees.
Congressional control over defense reprogramming has
progressed through a number of stages. The Appropriations
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Committees have required the Defense Department:
1. To keep them advised of major reprogrammings.
2. To submit semiannual tabulations of
reprograraming actions.
3. To report more frequently.
4. To obtain prior approval from the
Appropriations Committees for certain categories.
Due to the vagueness of the requirements the Defense
Department and the appropriations committees battled over
the degree of explicitness in reprogramming actions.
The Defense Department has written, rewritten, and
re-rewritten their directive on reprogramming procedures to
satisfy requirements of the committees. The emphasis in the
reprogramming directive is on the prompt notification
requirement for any reprogramming action, single or
cummulative, that exceeds these dollar thresholds:
1. An increase of $5 million or more in a budget
activity in the military personnel and operation and
maintenance appropriations.
2. An addition of $ 5 million or more in a
procurement line item or the addition to the procurement
line item base of a new item in the amount of $2 million or
more.
3. An increase of $2 million or more in any budget
subactivity line item in an appropriation for research
development, test, and evaluation, including the addition of
a new budget subactivity line item of $2 million or more, or
the addition of a new budget subactivity line item, the cost
of which is estimated to be 310 million or more within a
three-year period.
No comprehensive record of the number and dollar amount
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of reprogramming actions by the Defense Department has been
published. Occasionally, in committee hearings, committee
reports, and committee reprints, figures are available for
particular years. Figure 7 illustrates program activity
experienced in the past.
Reprogramming statistics rarely show the magnitude of
below-the-threshold actions (internal actions by the Defense
Department that are carried out without committee
notification or approval) . Internal reprogramming for
fiscal year 1964 through 1967 accounts for an average of
$1 , 1 billion a year.
It should be understood that a reprogramming action is
often made up of several reprogrammings with funds taken
from several projects and reallocated to other projects.
Thus a large number of reprogrammings (sometimes as many as
30 to 40) will b,e packaged together and presented as a
single request and be given a single DOD serial
(identification) number.
Another item of interest is the breakdown between
reprogramming actions that are subject to prior approval by
the designated committees and those that are merely sent to
the committee for notification. During the period 1 July
1967 to 19 February 1968 the Defense Department sent 97
formal reprogramming actions to the review committee. Of
the $3.6 billion involved, prior approval accounted for only
$122 million. The balance consisted of submissions for
notification [House Appropriations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. ].
Though reprogramming offers the Secretary of Defense an
effective tocl for preserving management flexibility it also
provides the opportunity for substantial re-emphasis of
policy. One such possibility is requesting funds for a
popular program today, knowing Congress will provide the
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funds, and reprogram for a disfavored project tomorrow.
An element of risk accompanies each reprogramming
proposal. Whenever the Defense Department requests that
funds be shifted from one program to another, it necessarily
admits the following:
1. The original program was overfunded or
2. There has been slippage in the original program
thus freeing additional funds or
3. The original program has been downgraded in
priority.
The resulting effect is that of alerting the Appropriation
Committees to potential areas for retrenchment and
economizing the next budget cycle.
There are numerous irr egularties which Louis Fisher
[Fisher, 1975] points out in his analysis of reprogramming
from using reprogramming -co remedy indecisiveness at the
time of budget submission to starting new programs using the
"foot-in-the -door" technique for obtaining additional funds.
These irregularities are receiving more attention in
Congress. Committee action in reprogramming and involvement
has become more acute and we find the committee members much
more sensitive to the issues of reprogramming. They are
paying more attention to reprogramming requests, asking more
questions and requiring the spirit of the original
appropriations be followed in subsequent reprogramming
action.
The scope of reprogramming by the Defense Department
helps to underscore the highly tentative nature of its





An interesting component of the budget which must be
mentioned is Federal and trust funds as execution tools.
The basic unit of classification is the appropriation or
fund account. The functional classification arrays
budgetary data according to the major purpose served by the
unit being classified, usually a budget account. Agency
activities are financed through Federal funds and through
trust funds.
Federal funds are of four types. The General fund is
credited with receipts not earmarked by law for a specific
purpose and is charged with payments from revenues and
general borrowing. Funds for DOD's operations and
maintenance accounts are from the General fund. "Special
funds contain Federal receipts earmarked for specific
purposes other than for carrying out a cycle of operation;
e.g., ship construction. "public Enterprise (revolving)
funds finance a cycle of business-type operations in which
outlays generate receipts, primarily from the public.
Examples are laundry service at the Naval Academy and the
Federal ship financing fund. "intergovernmental Revolving
and Management funds facilitate financing operations within
and between Government agencies; e.g., service stock funds.
The trust funds are established to account for receipt
and expenditure of monies by the Government for use in
carrying out specific purposes and programs in accordance
with the terms of a trust agreement or statute. These
monies are not available for the general purpose of the
Government. Nearly all trust fund appropriations are made
available for obligation until the objectives have beer-
attained (no-year-appropriations) . Examples are special





The vehemence of the current law concerning transfer of
funds stems from a history ranging from outright abuse of
the concept cf transfering funds to apparent conscientious
application.
The current law echoes the principle, "no money
appropriated for one purpose shall hereafter be used for any
other purpose than that for which it is appropriated", by
declaring that except "as otherwise provided by law, suras
appropriated for the various branches of expenditures in the
public service shall be applied solely to the obje'cts for
which they are respectively made, and for no others"[ Fisher
,
1975]. Exceptions to that general rule are fairly common,
sometimes supported by statutes, sometimes not.
The Department of Defense Appropriation Act contains
language which grants to the Secretary of Defense authority,
with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget, to
transfer funds between appropriations or funds in the
current fiscal year upon determination that such action is
necessary and in the national interest . The transfer
authority is normally stated as a dollar limitation not to
exceed a specified amount available to the Department of
Defense for military functions (except military
construction). Transferred amounts are merged with and made
available for the same purpose and time period as the
appropriation or fund to which it is transferred. The
Appropriation Act also provides that additional criteria
must be applied to the use of the tranfer authority and to
requests for other proposed reprogramraing actions.
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Transfers are not authorized unless for higher priority
items, based on unforeseen military requirements, than those
for which originally appropriated and in no case where the
item for which funds are requested has been denied by the
Congress [Fisher, 1975], The Secretary of Defense is
required to notify the Congress promptly of all transfers.
G. IMPOUNDMENTS AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT
The use of impoundment by the Executive Department is
another means available for exercising control in the budget
execution process. Defined as the withholding of funds
already appropriated by Congress to disallow their
expenditure, impoundments have been used sporadically from
the 1930»s through the 1960's. It was not until the Nixon
years that the issue of impoundments caused a general balk
by the Congress. Hearings and proceedings followed and as a
result general controls were placed on this policy
instrument.
Impoundments can be categorized by four types [Fisher,
1975].
1. Routine actions taken for purposes of
efficient management.
2. Withholdings which have statutory support.
3. Withholdings that depend on Constitutional
agreements.
4. The impoundment of domestic funds as part of
policy making and priority setting by the administration.
The executive branch has regarded appropriations as
permissive vice mandatory and routine withholdings often
occur to effect savings because of changing events and for
basic managerial reasons. Savings are realized whenever
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expenditures fall short of appropriations and it should be
considered wasteful to spend more just because you have the
funds. One can also see the use of impoundments to force a
savings situation by making managers perform their functions
with the reduced amount of funds caused by the impoundment.
Under this category of managerial type impoundments,
flexibility is required to meet the change in events in the
environment. If later events make an expenditure
unnecessary, administrators are expected to withhold funds
and return them to the Treasury. There may be numerous
reasons for suspending a program or payment. Funds may be
withheld on a temporary basis to see if a recent
environmental change may effect a better way of spending
those same funds for their intended purpose. Impoundments
also provide the administrator an immediate tool for
termination of funds being used improperly which would
otherwise take far too much time to uncover through the
normal investigation process and thus suffering an excessive
loss.
In many cases the President is authorized or directed by
law to withheld funds. Congress can direct a spending cut
and legislate reduction in spending for a lesser amount
leaving the balance of the directed cut to be fulfilled by
the President. Congress can also enact ceilings on
expenditures thereby giving the Ami nistration additional
statutory authority to impound funds.
The Antideficiency Act , as amended in 1950, authorized
the President to establish budgetary reserves "to provide
for contingencies, or to effect savings whenever savings are
made possible by or through changes in requirements, greater
efficiency of operations, or other developments subsequent
to the date on which such appropriation was made available."
Additionally there are even instances were individual
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appropriations bills will often provide some measure of
impoundment authority. This would be seen in the literature
of an appropriation which may direct withholding a certain
amount of funds subsequent to a particular event taking
place such as a physical, performance, or dollar threshold
level of an activity .
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for some
discretion and judgement on the part of executive officials
in the handling of public funds. A continual struggle
exists between the legislature and the executive. Congress
views impoundments as an encroachment upon their ability to
make policy and decide government policy while the Executive
Department claims that impoundment is consistaat with its
constitutional duty to, "take care that the laws be
faithfully executed", and "was authorized by the
constitutional provisions that vest the executive power with
the President [Fisher, 1975]."
In the areas of foreign affairs and national defense
there is considerable conflict between these two branches of
government concerning who should have the preponderance of
power in deciding policy. With regards to foreign affairs,
numerous statutes authorize the withholding of funds . When
the President acts under such authority, it is in support of
congressional policy, not antagonistic to it. Most of the
conflict exists in the area of national defense and the
"Commander-in-Chief" clause to impound funds. To protect
its perogatives, Congress has resorted to "floor s" (minimum
levels) for military forces which, to a certain degree,
restrict the magnitude of impoundments. In the area of
procurement, Congress is particularly sensitive to policy
making by impoundments and thay are paying more and more
attention to procurement practices.
The area of administrative policy-making falls in a
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category by itself due to its nature of pure policy-making
without statutory authority and unrelated to
Commander-in-Chief functions. Impoundments in this category
are a result of the president's direct withholding of funds
to suit his needs, desires, and/or wishes concerning policy.
Support of his actions by a few powerful congressmen can
facilitate the success of his actions. These actions can be
in pursuit of anti-inflationary goals, changing of executive





V. THE TREASURY'S ROLE IN BUDGET CONTROL
The Federal Government, like any enterprise, needs a
financial organization to estimate its financial needs;
receive, keep, and disburse its funds; and record and report
its financial information. The Constitution placed the fund
raising and fund granting authority in the Congress. The
Congress determines the purpose for which the funds will be
spent and the ways in which the revenues will be raised.
The duty of the Treasury Department is to conduct the flow
of funds in the manner prescribed by Congress (figure 8)
.
Thus one finds another link in the budget execution
process. The Treasury Department, which has an extremely
broad operating base, has numerous bureaus to carry out its
functions. The bureau which deals explicitly with central
accounting, reporting, disbursing, and bank services is the
Bureau of Government Financial Operations which is a product
of the recent merger of the Bureau of Accounts with the old
Bureau of Operations.
The primary fiscal concern of the Treasury Department is
having sufficient funds available for disbursement when
needed. Though the appropriation actions by Congress
control the "purse" they do not in themselves create public
funds for the Treasury to disburse.
The Treasury Department maintains cash balances based on
the current disbursing needs of the Government. Government
checks drawn on the Treasury clear through banking channels
against the available funds of the Treasurer in the Federal
Reserve System. The Treasury does not have branch banks
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throughout the United States and therefore uses the Federal
Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Banks and their 24
branches have been designated as fiscal agents of the
Treasury Department. In effect each bank performs all the
services that a branch office of the Treasurer would
perform.
The Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve Board
are components of the Federal Reserve System [Figure 9].
The system is designed as follows:
1. The Board of Governors consists of seven
members appointed for 14-year terms by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. It exercises general supervision
over Federal Reserve Banks and appoints three directors of
each Federal Reserve Bank.
2. There are 12 Federal Reserve Banks with 24
branches. The reserve banks hold the member banks reserve
accounts, issue Federal Reserve notes and act as banks of
deposit and as fiscal agents of the Government.
3. The Federal Open Market Committee directs the
system's open market operations conducted by its agent, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
4. The Federal Advisory Council consists of
twelve members from twelve Federal Reserve Banks. The
Council periodically confers with the Board of Governors on
general business conditions and makes recommendations to the
board on matters under their juristiction
.
5. 6,000 member banks consisting of all national
banks and such state banks and trust companies as have been
admitted.
The Federal Reserve System has the ultimate
responsibility for regulating the supply of money. Money is
defined in two categories, M1 and M2. M1 consists of cash
and demand deposits in the hands of business and households.
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M2 includes M1 plus time depositis. Whereas all the
functions of the Federal Reserve System are more or less
routine, the goal of correctly managing the money supply
entails the making of basic and unique policy decisions of a
non-routine character. changes in the level of M1 and H2
greatly effects economic conditions as outlined below:
N
Federal monetary policy influences commercial
bank reserves
-which-
Influences the supply of money
-which-
Influences the interest rate and the
availability of bank credit
-which-
Influences investment spending, output, employment,
and the price level.
Most of the Treasury receipts go into tax and loan
accounts. These accounts are in commercial banks that have
qualified as special depositories [Prochnow, 1960]. Those
receipts not going into the special accounts will go into
the Federal Reserve Banks or one of its branch banks. The
Reserve Eanks administer these accounts on behalf of the
Treasury, maintaining records, making sure the depository
has collateral (usually government securities) at the
Reserve Bank at least equal to the amount of the deposits,
and notifying the depository when the Treasury decides to
shift some of its balances at special depositories to its
accounts at the Federal Reserve Banks. This shifting is
done to replenish balances against which checks are
constantly being drawn.
Because the movement of money from private checking
accounts or from tax and loan accounts in commercial banks
to the Treasury accounts at the Federal Reserve Banks
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represents a loss of reserves to the banking system, and
because large sums can be involved ($ 5 billion or more at
quarterly tax payment dates, an amount in excess of a
quarter of all bank reserves) every effort is made to keep
such disturbing movements to a minimum.
In addition to exercising supervision of the Federal
Reserve Banks and member banks, the Federal Reserve Board
determines general monetary, credit, and operating policies
for the system as a whole and formulates the rules and
regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of the
Federal Reserve Act by which it was established.
Each Federal Reserve Bank and branch forwards a daily
transcript of transactions in the Treasurer's account to the
Treasurer's office. All Government checks except those
issued to make payments in foreign currencies are drawn on
the Treasurer of the United States. The checks, when
cashed, clear through commercial banks and the Federal
Reserve System to the Treasurer for examination and payment.
Checks are reconciled by the "banker" rather than by the
office writing the checks (for example the Xtt-1 tank project
office in DOD) . The integrated payment and reconciliation
process is performed by the Treasurer of the United States
in Washington on electronic data processing (EDP) equipment.
Every disbursing office drawing checks on the Treasurer
reports each month the number and amounts of checks issued.
This information is recorded in the data processing system.
As the checks are received for payment, the check
information is entered into the EDP system and matched
against the issue information. This process mainly performs
the function of determining the outstanding balance.
Checks which match stop-payment orders are examined to
determine whether payment should be refused. Checks which
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do not match the amount reported as issued by the disbursing
office are given detailed examination, and unless the
difference represents an obvious alteration by the
negotiators, the check is accepted for payment and a notice
of discrepency reported to the disbursing office for
adjustment. If the difference represents an overpayment to
the payee, the disbursing office must collect the
overpayment and deposit the money in the Treasurer's
account. If an undercharge to an appropriations or a fund
is involved, an additional charge to the account must be
processed. Check alterations or forgeries are referred to
the Secret Service for investigation and , where
identification is made, the case is referred to the Justice
Department for prosecution.
The Treasury Department maintains a system of central
accounts to provide a consolidated record of the
Government's financial transactions and to meet its
responsibility for reporting on the state of the
Government's finances to Congress and the public. These
central accounts do not constitute an overall general ledger
for all the Government's assets and liabilities. They do
represent a set of accounts which reflect the assets and
liabilities of the United States to which receipts and
expenditures and the Treasurer's cash operations, including
borrowings, are directly related on a month-by- month and
annual basis. These accounts are posted on the basis of:
1. Reports from disbursing offices for the
amounts of checks issued or cash payments made by the
administrative agencies for which sucn offices disburse, and
the related classification by account for the amounts of
receipts and disbursements processed for the administrative
agencies.




3. Reports from the Treasurer of the United
States for the amounts of deposits received in his account
and the amount of cash paid out of his account for checks
drawn on his account.
Subsidiary to the central accounts are the individual
appropriations, fund, and receipt accounts. Each month tne
Treasury Department prepares a statement of these individual
accounts and transmits it to the administrative agency
concerned to show the status (balance) based on the cash
receipt and disbursement data recorded in these accounts.
These statements serve as reconciliation media with the
agency's books. The final fiscal year statement of the
accounts is the basis for the official Combined Statement of
Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the United States
Government issued by the Treasury Department. These same
figures must also be used in agencies' budget presentations
to Congress. Also subsidiary to the central accounts are
individual accounts for each disbursing office's outstanding




VI. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
The General Accounting office (GAO) is a nonpolitical
nonpartisan agency in the legislative branch of the
Government. It was created by Congress through the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921 and placed under the direction
and control of the Comptroller General of the United States.
The Act vested in the GAO all the powers and duties formerly
prescribed for the Comptroller of the Treasury by statutes
extending back to 1789.
Until the Budget and Accounting Act created the GAO,
Congress relied on two main devices for the surveillance and
control of public fiscal activities: the language of the
appropriations acts, and a set of internal checks within the
executive branch. Appropriation acts were written in great
detail in an effort to control and guide the use of the
funds appropriated. The internal administrative checks were
designed to insure that, at each point in the expenditure of
funds, a different official would have to verify the
transaction, thus providing a measure of safety. These two
devices were occasionally followed by congressional
committee investigations.
The combination of these devices proved
inadeguate[ Brown, 1973]. Use of the detailed appropriation
language led, in time, to excessive specificity and proved
self-defeating as executive departments struggled- for a
degree of administrative flexibility. Many devices were
used, very often successfully, to circumvent congressional
intent, including transfers of funds, carrying forward of
unexpended balances, and incurring obligations in
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anticipation of deficiency of future appropriations. The
concept of internal administrative checks suffered a similar
fate. Delays and confusion in the financial chain became
commonplace, creating critical problems for the Treasury
Department and its accounting system. These weaknesses in
the apparatus of surveillance lead to reform efforts
beginning with the Dockery Act of 1894 and culminating in
the Budget and Accounting Act, which created the GAO[ Brown,
1970].
The GAO constitutes the last of the elements of control
in the budget execution process and performs the primary
function of auditing. One of the purposes for audits of
Government agencies is to make independent examinations for
Congress of the manner in which the agencies are discharging
their financial responsibilities. Another purpose for
audits is to review the results of agency programs and
activities. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, as
amended, provides for the Comptroller General to make such
reviews when ordered by either house of Congress, on his own
initiative, or when requested by any committee of the
Congress
.
The GAO finds its way into the budget execution process
by receipt of a copy of the Appropriations Act once it has
become law and performing its duties as outlined below.
Established to act in behalf of Congress, GAO is required by
the 1921 Act to:
1. Investigate all matters relating to the
receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds and
to make recommendations looking to greater economy or
efficiency in public expenditure.
2. Make such investigations and reports as shall
be ordered by either house of Congress or by any committee
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of either House having juristiction over revenue,
appropriations, or expenditures.
3. Furnish any such committee aid and information
as it may request.
It was desired that the Comptroller General become the
policeman of Congress rooting out inefficiency and gathering
facts on public funds expenditure. The principal functions




2. Accounting and financial management
3. Direct assistance to Congress
4. Legal decisions by the Comptroller General
5. Overseeing campaign spending and reporting
6. Claims settlement
7. Records of management services
Of these principle functions, the auditing function is
particularly influential in the budget execution process.
The GAO is concerned broadly with the receipt, disbursement,
and application of public funds. The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 directs the Comptroller General
to make expenditure analysis to enable Congress to determine
whether funds have been economically and efficiently
administered and expended.
Within certain exceptions, GAO' s authority and
responsibility extend to all activities, financial
transactions and accounts of the Federal Government. The
exceptions relate principly to the activities of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Exchange Stabilization Fund
established by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, and the Federal
land banks which are not subject to GAO audit.
Interestingly enough, many activities carried on by
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Government agencies, such as the nonappropriated fund
activities of the Department of Defense (post exchanges,
restaurants, canteens, vending machines, and personnel
recreation and welfare activities) are not subject to GAO
audit
.
Implicit in the audit responsibilities of GAO is the
responsibility to report information obtained as a result of
the audit work. The Comptroller General is required to
submit a report to Congress on its work at the beginning of
each session. At any time the Congress is in session, the
Comptroller General may make recomendations looking to
greater economy and efficiency in the public expenditures.
When findings, conclusions, and recommendations in GAO
reports do not require action by Congress, or are believed
not sufficiently significant to be of interest to Congress
or its committees, the reports are issued directly to
department or agency officials concerned. For each GAO
report containing recommendations to the head of any Federal
Agency, that agency must submit to the Government Operations
Committee a written statement of action taken. This
statement must be submitted within 60 days after issuance of
the GAO report. A similar statement is required to be
submitted to the Appropriations Committee in connection with
the agency's first request for appropriations submitted more
than 60 days after the date of the report.
Another function performed by the General Accounting
Office relating to the budget execution process is in the
,
countersigning of warrants. The Act of 2 September 1789,
creating the Treasury Department, required the use of
warrants for withdrawing money from the Treasury pursuant to
appropriations, for disbursements by the Treasurer of the
United States, and for acknowledging the receipt of money
into the Treasury. The law required these warrants to be
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signed by the Secretary of the Treasury and countersigned by
the Comptroller General. Although the use of checks has
replaced the use of warrants for withdrawl of funds from an
appropriations account, warrants are still used for
recording appropriations on the books of the Treasury
Department and the agency for which the appropriation is
made. The only warrants requiring countersignature by the
Comptroller General are those issued under continuing
resolutions.
The recently enacted Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 greatly expands the GAO
influence and authority in the budget execution process.
GAO furnishes additional assistance to Congress and its
committees in matters of fiscal and budgetary information
and controls including making program reviews and
evaluations.
Specifically, the Comptroller General reviews possible
efforts by the President, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, the head of any department or agency
of the United States, or any other officer or employee of
the United States to establish a reserve or propose to defer
budget authority without proper notification to Congress.
Discovery of such efforts results in a report to both houses
of Congress.
The Comptroller General is also empowered to bring suit
to obtain release of budgetary authority when funds are not
available as required by the impoundment control title.
Interest in limiting or making better use of
expenditures is on the increase. This is evident upon
review of the proceedings leading to the enactment of the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
Evaluation of programs, therefore, not only before thay are
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begun but during their operation as well , is becoming
standard procedure. The General Accounting Office is moving
from auditing after the fact to evaluation while the first
sums are being spent.
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VII. TIME SERIES DESIGN AND EXPERIMENTATION
Serving diverse purposes, a budget can be many things: a
political act, a plan of work, a prediction, a source of
enlightenment, a means of obfuscation, a mechanism of
control, an escape from restrictions, a means to action, a
brake on progress, even a prayer that the powers that be
will deal gently with the best aspirations of fallable
men[ Wildavsky, 1974].
In the most literal sense a budget is a document,
containing words and figures, which proposes expenditures
for certain items and purposes. Presumably, those who make
a budget intend that there will be a direct connection
between what is written in it and future events. Hence we
might conceive of a budget as intended behavior, as a
prediction. If the requests for funds are granted, and if
they are spent in accordance with instructions, and if the
actions involved lead to the desired consequences, then the
purposes stated in the document will be achieved. The
budget thus becomes the link between financial resources and
human behavior to accomplish policy objectives.
Control in the budget execution process is recognized as
one of the major problems confronting today's leaders.
Dissatisfaction with the degree of control over the budget
is seen at all levels in the Legislature. If this side of
the budget process can be controlled it would be fair to
conclude that there might be a better chance at achieving
the national goals.
The planning aspect of the budget has special emphasis
50

in this discussion and needs to be analyzed. Since funds
are limited and have to be divided in many ways r the budget
becomes a mechanism for making choices among alternatives.
When the choices are coordinated so as to achieve desired
goals, ths budget might be called a plan. One must be
conscious, however, of the possibilities of wide gaps
between the intentions of those who make up the plan and
their real accomplishments. Although the language of the
budget calls for the achievement of certain goals through
planned expenditures, investigation often reveals that no
funds, or far too few funds, have been spent for these
purposes, thus jeopardizing these goals.
Frustration arises among the planners of fiscal policy
when spending targets are not achieved or are far exceeded.
On 28 February 1977 top Carter Administration officals
revealed federal government spending was $7.6 billion less
than what had been scheduled for the first four months of
this fiscal year. They said they were baffled and
perplexed. The frustration arises when the planners are
counting en an anticipated or expected level of expenditures
to complement the administration's economic stimulus package
and then it is not realized. These budgeted expenditures
were some of the assumptions in support of current economic
policy and the mysterious "shortfall" required shifts in
emphasis to maintain the momentum in achieving desired
results. These abrupt shifts are not anticipated by the
planners and become very sensitive issues in future planning
operations.
Another recent problem of shortfalls in federal spending
turned up in a significant way last year when the Ford
Administration was equally baffled by what originally was
estimated as an $11 billion shortfall between March and
October. At that time, much of the shortfall was attributed
to a slowdown in defense spending and in part to lower
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interest rate costs to the government than originally
estimated on government bonds, bills, and notes.
In recognizing the fact that only a small degree of
controllability in the federal budget exists and recognizing
that the majority of the flexibility is in the area of
defense expenditures, it would seem that further analysis in
the area of defense expenditures would be useful for a
better understanding of the policy planning and control
capability of the budgetary process. Therefore the second
half of this study explored the implications of the
Department of Defense budget execution process as a policy
variable using time series analysis. By employing the use
of statistical regression technigues this study indentified
the trend, seasonal and cyclical variations for the
obligations and outlays of the Department of Defense. with
these variations the study attempted to explain the
responsiveness of obligations and outlays to directed
control.
The first guestion to be answered was whether the
reports of outlays issued by the Department of the Treasury
were representative of the actual outlays reported by the
Department of Defense. There is some concern that this was
not the case due to the lag time in reporting and the
techniques for gathering data for the reports.
Secondly one would expect a policy variable to fluctuate
with the change of plans and goals. It would also seem if
the variable were not regular in its process there would be
less heard about the rush to year-end-spending and more
concerning a rush to objective-spending; i.e., we would
witness more spending (higher volume) in directed efforts at
times which coincide with the change in emphasis rather than
change in the fiscal year. "Year-end-spending" implies a y
very regular process and regularity is a conflicting
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phenomenon in an environment which seemingly strives to meet
policy needs.
To begin the analysis of the expenditure process one
needs to examine the business world and hypothesize about
the behavior of the businessman. First, one can find the
business which focuses its decisions on the securing of
promises frcm its clientel. These promises would be in the
form of contracts, obligations made for services and similar
agreements. This businessman will in turn proceed to
conduct his operations and seek capitol based on these
promises. His search for capitol, either debt or equity,
influences the economy. Hence the obligation process of the
federal government is a policy variable which can effect the
economy in the manner just stated.
In a second instance one finds the business which
focuses its decisions on cash management. This businessman
will conduct his operations based on the cash situation
which exists in his organization. Therefore, his effects on
the economy will be regulated by a different variable. This
businessman will first evaluate his cash situation and then
decide upon an action for future operations. As might be
expected, the cash oriented businessman will be more
responsive to cash flows and such activities as tax payment
and receipts for services. Hence the outlay process of the
federal government is also a policy variable which can
effect the economy in the manner just stated.
In essence then the businessman who responds to promises
(contracts) , relying more heavily on the status of his
contracts and information on his search for debt and equity
capitol for his management decisions, will act on his





Although not addressed in this thesis, the
distinguishing characteristics of the promise versus cash
businessman related to the pattern of the length of debt
instruments for government contractors in defense would be
an interesting future study.
One can observe these operations from the Department of
Defense vantage point. Motivating actions are observed for
both of these business operating (decision) techniques. On
the one hand one finds the voluminous number of contracts
which are entered. These obligations are the initiating
force behind many business operations. The second
technique, that of cash management, is also fed by the
government in the process of liquidating obligations by
issuing checks in payment for services.
This study looked at the regularity of obligations and
outlays and attempted to evaluate them as policy variables.
A first question in this analysis was, "Is there a
significant difference between the pattern of obligation of
Department of Defense funds and the expenditure of these
funds?" The next question follows, "Which is a more regular
pattern indicating the lesser influence as a policy
variable?"
Recall from previous discussion that there exists
explicit instructions on • the obligation of funds by
agencies. Decisions concerning the flow of cash outlays are
not to be found at the agency level. This is undsr standable
in that an agency normally disburses its cash assets when
services have been rendered or in accordance with a
contract's progress payments scheme; not when it would best
suit an agency's policy. This point is made to emphasize
that policy influence can exist explicitly in the area of




Time series analysis deals with past patterns of
performance. In making decisions military planners believe
that the future follows the past with some degree of
regularity, that what has happened in the past will, to a
greater or lesser extent, continue to happen or will again
happen in the future under similar circumstances. The
collection, sorting, and evaluation of past performance data
is a complex process. The discovery of regularities and
patterns in the behavior of statistical information helps
the planning process.
The first step in planning for the future consists then,
of gathering observations from the past. In this concern
one usually deals with statistical data which are collected,
observed, or recorded at successive intervals of time which
are generally referred to as "time series."
It is virtually impossible nowadays to avoid seeing the
use of graphs of time series to show the behavior of stoclcs,
bonds, sales, employment, etcetera. This is very true in
reviewing analysis presented by the Department of Defense as
well as other agencies of the government. Some of these
graphs look like straight lines, others look like smooth
curves, but most, and above all those representing economic
data, give the impression of the haphazard scrawlings of a
three-year-old child. With the use of statistics and time
series methodology order can be brought to the patterns and
the seemingly erratic appearance of the basic data. The
classical time series multiplicative model was used in this
analysis.
Y =TxSxCxI
t t t t t
The fluctuations of a time series can be classified into
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four basic types of variations which, superimposed and
acting all in concert, account for the changes in the series
over a period of time and give the series its irregular
appearance [Boot, 1974]. These four patterns, movements,
or, as they are often called, components of a time series
are:
1. The Trend (T )
t
2. Seasonal Variation (S )
t
3. Cyclical Variation (C )
4. Irregular Variation (I )
When speaking of the trend of a time series it
ordinarily means the smooth or regular movement of the
series over a fairly long period of time. Intuitively
speaking, the trend of a time series displays the general
sweep of its development, or better, it characterizes the
gradual and consistant pattern of its changes.
The seasonal variation may perhaps be the easiest to
understand consisting of regular repeating patterns.
Although the name implies a connection with seasons of the
year , it is used to indicate any kind of variation which is
of periodic nature and where the period is not longer than
one year.
Irregular or erratic fluctuations of a time series are
those variations which are either completely unpredictable
or which are caused by such isolated special occurences as
good and bad news, bank failures, elections, floods,
earthquakes, strikes, and wars. Some influences which can
be classed as erratic are barely noticeable, working
themselves out before much of anything is felt.
From one point of visw, the so-called business cycle is
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nothing more than the variation that remains in a time
series after the trend, seasonal variation, and irregular
variation have been eliminated. More generally it might be
said that the cycle consists of recurrence of the up and
down movements of activity from some sort of statistical
trend or "normal." Normal implies the same kind of
statistical average which tends to generalize an
observation. The essential difference between seasonal and
cyclical effects is that seasonal effects are predictable,
occuring at a given interval of time within a year from the
last occurence. Cyclical effects are less predictable in
that the length of the cycle must literally be guessed by
cogitating over the data and making trial and error runs.
Defining these four movements as those which make up the
time series is an assumption which is not universally agreed
upon. Some economists feel that the given classifications
are too crude, that there are, in fact, more than four types
of movements. It is further noted that the effects of these
four types of movements may not be seperable. They may be
additive, multiplicative, or they might be combined in any
one of an indefinitely large number of ways. (The reader
that is inclined to seek more in time series analysis will




The data used for this time series analysis of the DOD
financial activities was from monthly reports of
obligations, outlays, and expenditures for the five most
recent years available (fiscal years 1971 - 1976). Monthly
outlays by the Department of Defense were collected from the
report rendered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) entitled, "Monthly Outlays by Apprpriation
Title." These reports are commonly called FAD reports, FAD
indicating Finance and Accounting Division. As in any
comprehensive report of financial summaries there were
numerous subtotals and totals throughout the report. The
figures used in this analysis included the total dollar
figure for all military functions excluding Military
Assistance Program Federal funds.
Caution was exercised in using figures from these
reports. Recalling earlier discussion of the composition
and definition of an outlay, an outlay from an agency, in
this case DOD , may not mean an expenditure which effects
the economy at the time of the outlay. Outlays are recorded
when checks are issued. Receipients might not cash these
checks immediately upon receipt. Actual outlays
(expenditures) may be reflected in a later time period and
even in the next fiscal year. Some outlays take place as
payments to another Federal agency. These outlays will have
a zero effect upon the total Federal expenditures in that
they merely cause a transfer of funds between agencies and
no money is directly going to the economy.
To obtain data on the monthly expenditures and
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obligations, figures were taken from the "Monthly Statement
of Receipts and Outlays of the United States Government"
which is published by the Treasury Department. Outlays by
the Treasury Department are recorded as checks clear through
the Federal Reserve Banks. It is at this time we know the
money has entered the economy and would be measured as H1-
Obligations incurred for national defense were tabulated in
dollar figures and were extracted from the monthly Treasury
statements containing the expenditure data. Although the
inclusive categories composing these total obligation
figures were not available, there was no loss in the
relevance of the analysis at its level of aggregation since
the results were used to evaluate or characterize the role
that obligations play in this control process.
The data collected was not adjusted or manipulated in
any way, other than conventional rounding-off techniques.
Due to the nature of this study it would not achieve any
additional advantage or would not eliminate any biases by
adjusting for calendar variation, price changes, and
population changes which are considered the normal
adjustments prior to analysis. Calendar changes require
adjustment to a thirty day calendar for all months. This
step was not taken due to the nature of our budgetary system
which is highly responsive to the change of month and
subsequently that. of quarters and to smooth all the months
might have caused the loss of a seasonal or cyclical effect
which we were attempting to identify.
Adjusting for price changes would not have assisted this
analysis and may even have caused a loss in time series
component identity. Adjustments for population were not




When one tries to describe the overall movement of a
time series he generally thinks of a smooth curve of some
sort. The simplest curve to visualize, or to fit, is the
straight line. The most widely used method for fitting the
trend is the method of "least squares" using the regression
tool of analysis as described by the following model:
Y' = a + bx
The value (x) represented the time period to which the
measurement value (Y) refers. Regression requires that the
sum of the squares of the differences between the actual
values outlays and obligations (Y) and the calculated trend
values (Y') be a minimum. That is, in the linear equation:
Y» = a + bx
a and b will have to be chosen such that:
Z (Y-Y«)
is a minimum. Figure 10 shows the results of the regression
line for DOD outlays from the FAD reports along with the
actual values of those outlays. The results yielded:
Y' = 5.76 + .0292x
The trend is an intuitively appealing concept and also
provides us with a tool to facilitate additional steps in
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the time series analysis. As expected, it was upward
sloping to the northeast determined by the estimated
coefficients a and b.
The second part of the regression analysis was to ask
the question, "how good is the fit of this line to the data
used?" A very useful measure of dispersion is given by the
2
coefficient of determination (R ) which shows the proportion
of total variance accounted for by the estimating
relationship of the explained variance to the total
variance. When all the observed points in the sample are on
the least-squares line (trend line) , the coefficient of
determination equals 1 and there is no unexplained or
residual variance. In the analysis of the DOD outlays
2
(figure 10) the R equaled .4816. This was a very low value
indicating a less than good fit.
The results from the regression analysis of the Treasury
reported outlays (expenditures) by DOD (figure 11) yielded:
I' = 5.75 + .0297x
The reported obligations incurred (figure 12) yielded:
Y» = 6.19 + .0558x
The third part of the regression analysis was to
consider the degree of dependence the observed data had on
each other. It is sometimes found that high or large values
seem to perpetuate large values and low values perpetuate
low values. If this condition existed it would tend to
devalue the usefulness of our regression analysis using the
existing observations. The Dur bin- Watson test for serial
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correlation was used to evaluate this level of dependence








The Durbin-Watson results gives:
d = 2.103
which is indicative of no serial correlation. The 95%
significant inconclusive region of the Durbin-Watson
analysis existed between the points 1.47 and 1.54. These
results allowed us to continue with confidence in the
usefulness of the data.
B. THE SEASONAL
With the regression line (the trend) established, the
foundation for continued analysis was set. The technique
used for calculating the seasonal index was based on
determining a figure which represented each month expressing
it as a percentage of the average month in the five year
period. For example, if the seasonal index for the month of
April was 91.5, this meant that April outlays (or




There are many methods for obtaining seasonal indexes.
The one used in this study was the "ratio-to-moving
average"[ Fruend, 1969]. This technique clearly seperated
the seasonal and trend components/ was flexible in case of
non-linear trends, and in the presence of short time spans,
5 or 10 years, moving averages were easier to use to
describe trend and cyclical variations rather than specific
mathamatical curves.
The first step was to compute the twelve-month moving
average, which completely eliminated any patterns which
regularly repeat year after year, for the sixty periods.
This was accomplished by adding the values of the first
twelve periods and dividing to obtain the average. This
value was then identified with the sixth period. The value
for the seventh period resulted from the average of the
values for periods two through thirteen inclusive. The
eighth period value was from periods three through fourteen,
and so on.
For each period which had a twelve-month moving average
value (periods 1-6 and 55-60 did not have these values due
to this technique of averaging) the percentage of moving
average was determined. The percentage of moving average is
designed to eliminate the trend and cyclical components for
our data, thus leaving seasonal and irregular variations as
the only variations. The percentage of moving average was
determined by dividing the actual observed value of our
outlay by the twelve-month moving average and multiplying
that value by 100.
C. IRREGULAE VARIATION
All that remained to be done was eliminate, so far as
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possible, the irregular variation by averaging the
respective values obtained from the different months.
Figure 13 shows the tabulation of the seasonal index for DOD
outlays. It is noted that there were only four values for
each month since the moving average failed to provide
averages for the first half of fiscal year 1972 and the last
half of fiscal year 1976 as already mentioned. The median
method of averaging was used for determining the individual
month values. Since the total percentage should total 1200
(100 for each month) a correction factor was computed and
applied to each value. In this case the correction factor
was 1200/1203.59 = .997. The seasonal index of 86.7 for
July indicated the July outlays were 86.7 percent of the
overall average monthly outlays, August outlays were 101.99
per cent of the overall average monthly outlays, and so on.
Figure 14 shows the graphic results of the seasonal index.
As could be expected the seasonal resulting from the
Treasury reported DOD outlays (figure 16) is very similar to
those reported by DOD indicating that, a standard pattern for
check clearing time has developed between the Treasury and
the business community as a whole. Figure 15 shows the
tabulated computations. The seasonal for the incurred
obligations is illustrated in figure 18 with the tabulated
computations in figure 17.
D. CYCLICAL VARIATION
The cyclical variation was isolated by eliminating the
other three components. The method used was the "residual
method"[ Fruend, 1969]. First the data was adjusted for
trend and seasonal variation. This adjustment was made by
dividing out the trend and seasonal variation arriving at
cyclical-irregulars. The irregular variation was then
removed resulting with cyclical relatives.
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Trend and seasonal adjusting was achieved by multiplying
the trend value of each period times its appropriate
seasonal index giving the "normal." The "normal" is the
value to be expected if the trend and the seasonal forces
were the only contributing factors to the series. The next
step included dividing the actual DOD outlay value by the
normal and multiplying by 100. This resulted in the
"cyclical-irregular" which may also be called "percentage of
trend." To isolate the cyclical component completely,
insofar as this is possible, irregular variations were
eliminated by using a weighted three-month moving average.
This technique avoided averaging (smoothing) out too much
variation while still accomplishing the elimination of
irregular variation. The weighted moving average was
calculated by adding the cyclical-irregular value of the
preceeding and following period to twice the value of the
current period and dividing the results by four. The result
was a cyclical relative value which again can be called a
"percentage of trend" in this case without irregular
variations. Figure 19 shows the cyclical plotted with the
trend
.
These steps were performed with the Treasury data and




IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Deep concern, almost to the level of alarm, over the
amount of defense spending and underspending should be
tempered with an appropriate degree of expectation based on
the cumulative components of fiscal policy guidelines from
the Executive, fiscal policy requirements from the
Legislatu re, and fiscal objectives stated by the Secretary
of Defens e. To rely on the predicted results of one
component not considering the influence of the other
components is likely to result in an inaccurate conclusion.
The applicability of time series analysis in such a complex
entity as the defense expenditure process with so many
participants is very pertinent in facilitating the combined
consideration of all these elements.
The analysis supports the conclusion that the Treasury
report of DOD outlays is an accurate representation of the
DOD outlays based on the results from the regression
analysis. Virtually the same trend line, seasonal
variation, and cyclical variation existed in both reports.
The concern over a time lag between DOD outlays and the
Treasury report of thesa is not supported with the results.
Further verification of similarity is obtained by viewing
figures 10, 11, 14, 16, 19, and 20.
In evaluating the trends of outlays and obligations an
attempt was not made to analyze any deeper then mere
comparison of patterns since the coefficient of
determination indicates a poor comparative trend fit. The
trend in obligations was a greater sloping line the,n that
for outlays. This might be indicative of the availability
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of multi-year obligational authority. Some cautions must be
added concerning regression analysis when applied to time
series. Most of the assumptions, such as independence,
normality, and constant variance are usually not relevant to
time series data. Thus it is impossible to attach a measure
of statistical confidence to the prediction made from the
trend line, however the real worth of time series analysis
in this area is in the seasonal implications.
The greatest variation in components was seen indeed in
the seasonal variations represented as a percent of the
trend. At the begining of a fiscal year we see the outlays
rapidly increased from a low level which would tend to
reflect the receipt of funds from the new appropriations
bill, a significant point being the existance of a very low
level of outlays at the begining of a fiscal year (86. 7% of
the trend). This predominant seasonal result might indicate
an institutional inertia in the agency and national
economy's behavior concerning outlays capable of overriding
such strong influences as Presidential and Congressional
planning for the transition quarter. When so many
participants conduct their operations consistant with the
seasonal variation, it might be too much to expect a high
level of spending in the early months of a fiscal year even
when the emphasis is placed in that direction.
On the contrary, the level of obligations was very high
at the begining of a year, declines, and then is very high
at the end of the fiscal year. The data supported the
common belief that there is much obligating at the end of a
year.
The obligational seasonal also showed much more regular
variation then did the outlay seasonal. How do we interp^s9t
this, or is there an explanation? The answer to this




obligations. Short term obligations would likely follow
seasonal changes, construction and repairing for the spring
and summer months while procurement may not follow any
seasonal pattern. The disaggregation of defense obligations
and outlays to appropriations accounts would be an area for
further analysis.
The cyclical variation was very difficult to evaluate
especially when so eratic as is the case with this data.
Taxing the perception to the fullest extent one might claim
that the obligational cyclical variation was fairly regular
with a complete cycle lasting six months with peaks at the
July-August-September period and January-February-March time
period. The outlay cyclical did not give way to any real
definitive cycle for evaluation. An interesting observation
was that the cyclic obligation peaks occured roughly just a
month before the cyclic outlay peaks when they do occur. If
we accept the premise that regularity in cyclic variation
would imply the least effective control device, we would
then have to conclude that outlays show more potential as a
policy control variable than do obligations.
The peak periods in obligations suggested regularity in
winter months which could be a result of increased
construction and repair planning and the summer months which
coincided with the close of the fiscal year. These peak
periods coincided very closely with the seasonal variation
which more strongly reinforced the obligation pattern as a
highly regular instrument. This further negated the belief
of policy influence being a prevalant factor in the
obligation arena of budget execution.
In this analysis an attempt to identify budget execution
control as a policy control variable with time series
analysis was persued. The budget execution process did not
appear to be a highly responsive policy tool. A highly
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responsive control variable would have resulted in definite
non-regularity in the observed components of the time
series. A high degree of regularity existed within DOD
oblig-a-tions and a lesser degree in DOD outlays. Addressing
the obligation/cash management question, the results showed
the least regularity in the outlays. This implies a greater
tendency for the cash management oriented businessman to be
more impacted by federal government fiscal policy. Farther
evaluation of business operations in this area should be
done to draw a more definite conclusion.
Areas for further study include an analysis of decision
techniques used by business entities who deal with DOD
contracting at all dollar volume levels both in the short
term and long term. Furt her analysis over the new fiscal_
year time period should indicate the validity of the results
obtained in this analysis. The variations may continue as
they did in the historical data or some results should shift
to meet the new fiscal year time table. The new fiscal year
may also enhance the seasonal and/or cyclic characteristic
of high winter and summer obligations and outlays. This
analysis was highly aggregated. Another technique which
might be pursued is a highly disaggregated study focusing on
one appropriation account, or possibly comparing two
different accounts.
This study reviewed the DOD budget execution process
from enactment of the appropriations bill to the writing of
government checks for services rendered. It also followed
an exercise in time series analysis of DOD outlays and
obligations. The complex problem of budget execution
control will continue to be a major concern of the budgetary
process. This analysis reduces some of the complexity in
understanding the budget execution process by providing a
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Military Personnel 1 Year
Operations & Maintenance 1 Year
Procurement 3 Years
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Figure 5 - APPROPRIATIONS TO APPORTIONMENT
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Relation of Bucket Authority to Outlays— J976 Budget
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Figure 6 - RELATION OF BUDGET AUTHORITY TO OUTLAYS
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seal Military Operation & Procurement RDT&E Total
ear Personnel Maintenance
1956 158 455 1515 N/A 2128
1957 85 214 2056 N/A 2355
1961 N/A N/A 2796 994 3791
1962 N/A N/A 1482 426 1908
1963 N/A N/A 913 862 1775
1964 40 219 1272 473 2008
1965 63 230 1256 434 1985
1966 75 230 1552 495 2253
1967 191 398 2234 549 3373
1968 181 121 3899 596 4797
1970 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2431
1971 366 585 1701 523 3266
1972 328 53^ 654 164 1680
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